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BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH: JUSTICE SCALIA'S FEAR OF AN
UNFAMILIAR RACE AND RELIGION
SCOTT S. ALLEN JR.*
In Boumediene v. Bush,' the Supreme Court of the United
States considered whether the Military Commissions Act of 20062
(MCA) serves as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas
3 4
corpus . The Court held, first, that the MCA "strips" jurisdiction over
Guantanamo Bay detainees' habeas actions from all federal courts. 5
Second, the Court concluded that the Suspension Clause in Article 1,
Section 9 of the United States Constitution is in effect at the United
States Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).6 Third, the
Court decided that Congress did not provide an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas corpus in the Detainee Treatment Act, 7 thereby
rendering MCA § 7 an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. 8 Lastly, the Court determined that the detainees need
not wait for the completion of review of their Combatant Status
Review Tribunal 9 in the Court of Appeals before bringing a habeas
action in federal district court.' 0 In his dissent criticizing the majority's
opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia stated, "America is at war with radical
Islamists."1 Such language implicates the fear of an unfamiliar race
with unique religious practices. Though Scalia's demonstrated fear
Copyright © 2009 by Scott S. Allen Jr.
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1. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
2. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); see infra Part II.B.
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (8th ed. 2004) ("A writ employed to bring a
person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention is
not illegal.").
4. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240.
5. Id. at 2244.
6. Id. at 2262; see infra note 146.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(e) (2006); see infra Part l.B.
8. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 121-25.
10. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
11. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See infra Part IV.
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may not be unfounded, 13 it is unprecedented in previous habeas corpus
jurisprudence-including Scalia's previous dissents in Guantanamo
detention habeas corpus cases. 14 Scalia may have included this fearful
language as a last-ditch effort-after a long line of GTMO habeas
corpus jurisprudence-to influence courts' future habeas corpus
opinions to subscribe to his conservative viewpoint.' 5
1. THE CASE
The petitioners are foreign nationals who were detained at the
United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). 16 Some
of the petitioners were captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan.
17
Each has denied membership in al Qaeda-the terrorist group
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks' -and the Taliban-the
political party that harbors members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan. 19
However, each petitioner stood before a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal 20 (CSRT) and was classified as an "enemy combatant.",21
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. See infra Part IV.C.
16. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). GTMO is comprised of 45
square miles along the southeast coast of Cuba, which were acquired in a lease agreement in
1903, after the Spanish-American War. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004). In 1934,
Cuba and the United States entered into a treaty that stated that the lease agreement would
remain in effect until the United States abandoned the base or another agreement was made.
Id. Over 750 detainees have been held at the United States Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay
since January 2002. See List of Individuals Detained by the Dep't of Def. at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba from Jan. 2002 through May 15, 2006 (May 15, 2006) [hereinafter, Detainee List],
available at
http://media.miamiherald.com/smedia/2008/02/29/16/DARBI.source.prod affiliate.56.pdf.
However, only seven of the detainees were parties to this lawsuit. Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
17. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. The other petitioners were captured in Bosnia and
Gambia. Id.
18. See infra text accompanying note 193.
19. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 224 1. In September 2001, the Taliban controlled 90% of
Afghanistan. Commander Syed N. Ahmad, JAGC, USN, The Unconstitutional Prosecution of
the Taliban Under the Military Commissions Act, 55 NAVAL L. REV. I, 5 (2008). However, the
United Nations General Assembly recognized the Northern Alliance as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan. Id. From 1994 to 2001, the Taliban battled the Northern Alliance
in an attempt for government control. See id. at 4-5.
20. See Press Release, Dep't of Def., Combatant Status Review Tribunal Order Issued
(July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7530
(discussing the establishment of CSRTs by the Department of Defense); see also infra text
accompanying notes 121-25.
21. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. The term "enemy combatant" has no official
definition in the law of war. Ahmad, supra note 19, at 7. However, the Military Commissions
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Each "enemy combatant" then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
22
Petitioners' actions to dispute their detention at GTMO began
in February 2002. 23 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia dismissed the cases because GTMO was outside the
sovereign jurisdiction of the United States. 24 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the decision. In 2004, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that 28 U.S.C.
§224 126 extended habeas corpus jurisdiction to GTMO. 27
In 2005, the detainee cases were consolidated into two separate
actions within the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.28  In Khalid v. Bush,29 Judge Leon held that the detainees
had no habeas corpus rights. 30  However, in In re Guantanamo
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, defines both "unlawful enemy combatant"
and "lawful enemy combatant." An "unlawful enemy combatant" is defined as "(i) a person
who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant (including
a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces) . I... d  A "lawful enemy
combatant" is defined as "(A) a member of the regular forces of a State party engaged in
hostilities against the United States .... ." Id. In Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz's
memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy establishing CSRTs, he defines "enemy
combatant" as "an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy Secretary of Def., to Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004) (on file with author)
(ordering the establishment of CSRTs).
22. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241. Detainees are notified of their right to petition for a
writ of habeas corpus during their CSRT hearing. Press Release, supra note 20.
23. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241; see Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C.
2002) ("The question presented to the Court ... is whether aliens held outside the sovereign
territory of the United States can use the courts of the United States to pursue claims brought
under the United States Constitution.").
24. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
25. Id.; see Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
[The detainees] cannot seek release based on violations of the Constitution
or treaties or federal law; the courts are not open to them. Whatever other
relief the detainees seek, their claims necessarily rest on alleged violations
of the same category of laws listed in the habeas corpus statute, and are
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(a)-(d) is later amended to include the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e). Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2006); see infra Part
ll.B.
27. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241.
28. Id.
29. 355 F. Supp. 2d311 (D.D.C. 2005).
30. Id. at317.
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Detainee Cases,3 1 Judge Hens Green held that the detainees had due
process32 rights under the Fifth Amendment. 33  The government
appealed Judge Hens Greens' ruling and petitioners cross-appealed.34
While the District Court's decisions were pending appeal,
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The
DTA stated, "no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear
or consider ... an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba." 36  Additionally, the DTA stated that the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit would hold
"exclusive" jurisdiction to review CSRTs. 37
However, in 2006, the Supreme Court held in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld38 that the DTA was not applicable to cases pending-similar
to petitioners' cases-when the DTA was enacted.3  In response,
Congress amended the DTA with the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA). 40 The MCA denied federal courts jurisdiction over
"enemy combatants' habeas actions. 41
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
42Columbia Circuit consolidated the petitioners' cases on appeal.
Despite Congress' MCA amendment to the DTA, petitioners filed a
supplemental brief in hope of being released from GTMO based on the
31. 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).
32. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 538-39 (8th ed. 2004) ("The conduct of legal
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement
of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the
power to decide the case.").
33. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger.., nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
35. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2006); see also infra Part lI.B.
36. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2241 (2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
37. Id.
38. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see infra Part lI.B..
39. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2241-42 (referencing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576-77).
40. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242 (referencing Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600
(2006)); see also infra Part ll.B.
41. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636;
Bournediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242; see infra Part lI.B.
42. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
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holding in Hamdan.43 The Court of Appeals held that the MCA
"strips" jurisdiction over petitioners' habeas actions from all federal
courts; 44 that the petitioners are not "entitled to the privilege of the writ
[of habeas corpus] or the protections of the Suspension Clause [in
Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution, which prohibits the suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus unless during times of rebellion or
invasion 45]; 46 and, as a result, it was "unnecessary to consider
whether Congress provided an adequate and effective substitute for
habeas corpus in the DTA."47 In holding that detainees at GTMO have
no privileges of habeas corpus or the protections of the Suspension
Clause, the Court of Appeals primarily relied on precedent set forth in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, which limited the habeas corpus rights of
enemy aliens detained in China during World War I1.
48
On June 29, 2007, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari49 to decide three issues: (1) whether the MCA denies federal
courts jurisdiction over detainee habeas corpus actions that were
pending during its enactment; 50 (2) whether "enemy combatants"
detained at GTMO have the privilege of habeas corpus or can invoke
the Suspension Clause; and (3) if the first two questions are
answered in the affirmative, whether the MCA provided "adequate
52substitute procedures" for habeas corpus.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Actions disputing the jurisdictional bounds of military tribunals
date back to 1866 when the Supreme Court decided Ex parte
43. Id.
44. Id. "[MCA § 7] states that 'the amendment ... which repeals habeas jurisdiction-
applies to 'all cases, without exception' relating to any aspect of detention. It is almost as if
the proponents of these words were slamming their fists on the table shouting 'When we say
'all,' we mean all-without exception!"). Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir.
2007).
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. "The suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus] does not
authorize the arrest of any one, but simply denies to one arrested the privilege of this writ in
order to obtain his liberty." Ex pare Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 115 (1866).
46. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242 (citing Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990-91).
47. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
48. See 399 U.S. 763 (1950); see also infra Part II.A.
49. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007). The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari in April 2007, holding that the Supreme Court "requir[es] the exhaustion of
available remedies as a precondition to accepting jurisdiction over applications for the writ of
habeas corpus." Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007).
50. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2242.
51. Id. at 2244.
52. Id. at 2262.
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Milligan.53  During and immediately following World War II,
prisoners continued to question their habeas corpus rights and the
legality of military tribunals in cases such as Ex parte Quirin54 and
Johnson v. Eisentrager.
55
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress
granted the President authorization to use "all necessary and
appropriate force" against al Qaeda.56 President George W. Bush
exercised this grant of power by imprisoning detainees at the United
States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO).57 Detainees
disputed their imprisonment in cases such as Rasul v. Bush58 and
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.59 In response, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) in an effort to limit the jurisdiction of
federal courts over detainee habeas corpus cases.60 In June 2006, the
Supreme Court decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.6' In return, Congress
amended the DTA with the Military Commissions Act (MCA) in
another attempt to limit the federal courts' jurisdiction to preside over
GTMO detention actions.
62
A. Actions Questioning the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals and
Habeas Corpus Rights of Detainees Before September 11, 2001
In 1866, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ex parte Milligan.
63
During the peak of the Civil War, the commanding general of the
military district of Indiana arrested petitioner, Lambdin P. Milligan
64
and charged him with aiding the Confederacy and conspiring against
53. 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see infra Part II.A.
54. 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see infra Part II.A. Another interesting case questioning the
imprisonment of detainees during WWII is Korematsu v. United States. See 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (questioning the detainment and anti-espionage regulations imposed on United States
citizens of Japanese descent who resided on the West Coast). However, the Court in
Korematsu applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not
raise habeas corpus issues. Id. at 234-35.
55. 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see infra Part ii.A.
56. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001);
see infra Part II. B..
57. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
58. 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see infra Part lI.B.
59. 542 U.S. 507 (2004); see infra Part 11.B.
60. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2006); see infra Part 11.B.
61. 548 U.S. 557 (2006); see infra Part lI.B.
62. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600; see infra Part 11.B.
63. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
64. id. at 107.
2009] UNFAMILIAR RACE AND RELIGION 187
65the United States. Milligan was detained and eventually brought
before a military commission. 66 Milligan argued that the military
commission did not have jurisdiction because he was a citizen of the
67 68State of Indiana and the United States, not in the military services,
had never resided in any of the rebellious Confederate states since the
beginning of the Civil War, and had a right to trial by jury-a guarantee
under the United States Constitution.69 The Court held that military
tribunals cannot preside over civilian cases where civilian courts are
open. 70 The Court noted that Milligan's constitutional right to a trial by
jury had been violated. 71 As a result, the writ of habeas corpus should
65. Id at 122. Milligan and four associates allegedly planned to steal Union weapons
and attack Union prisoner-of-war camps. Milligan intended to recruit the POWs to aid in the
takeover of other POW camps, the state government of Indiana, as well as Ohio and Illinois.
SAMUEL KLAUS, THE MILLIGAN CASE 32-33 (1970). Milligan was also charged with "inciting
insurrection." Milligan, 71 U.S. at 122.
66. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107. On September 15, 1863-during the Civil War-President
Abraham Lincoln, for the first time in American history, suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 115. Milligan was detained from October 5, 1864 to January 2, 1865. Id. at 131. On
October 21, 1864, the military commission sentenced Milligan to death by hanging. Id. at 107.
"Abraham Lincoln cited [Andrew] Jackson's wartime actions when justifying his
administration's restrictions on civil liberties during the Civil War." Mark A. Graber, Book
Review of Matthew Warshauer's Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law. 105
REGISTER OF THE KY HIST. SOC. I, 17-19. During the War of 1812, Major General Andrew
Jackson declared martial law. Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American
Empire, 1767-1821, 308 (1977). When martial law is declared during wartime, "the army,
instead of civil authority, governs the country because of a perceived need for military security
or public safety." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 996 ( 81h ed. 2004). After declaring martial law,
Jackson expelled those who claimed to be French citizens from New Orleans. Remini, supra
note 66, at 309. After a newspaper writer criticized Jackson's expulsion order, Jackson had the
writer arrested. A lawyer who witnessed the arrest, rushed to Federal District Judge Dominick
Augustin Hall, who granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Jackson responded by
having Judge Hall arrested. Id.
67. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 108.
68. Id. at 131.
69. ld at 108.
70. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121-22. The majority asserted that Congress did not have the
power to authorize a military trial for a civilian defendant when civilian courts are open, even
during wartime. Id. The dissent disagreed, saying Congress had the power to authorize a
military tribunal in this case, but did not exercise such power. Id. at 137 (Chief Justice,
dissenting). The dissent noted that Congress' power to authorize military tribunals is attached
to Congress' power to declare war and is not outweighed by an individual's Fifth Amendment
rights. Id. at 138-39.
71. Id. at 122-23. The Court relied heavily on interpretation of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments:
The sixth amendment affirms that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury" ...
but the fifth, recognizing the necessity of an indictment, or presentment,
before any one can be held to answer for high crimes, "excepts cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service,
in time of war or public danger .. "
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have been issued 72 and thus, Milligan was to be "discharged from
custody." 73 In so holding, the Court stated that "[t]he Constitution of
the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at
all times, and under all circumstances.5
The Court reached a different result in Exparte Quirin,75 a case
heard during World War 11.76 In Quirin, petitioners were Germans
(except for one American citizen) who infiltrated American soil,
armed with explosives, with intent to destroy strategic military bases.77
The petitioners were captured 78  and placed before a military
commission, pursuant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's order.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V-VI.).
72. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 130-3 I.
73. Id. at 131. The Court agreed with Milligan's interpretation of the act of Congress of
March 3, 1863. Milligan argued that the act mandated his release since he was a citizen of the
State of Indiana; he was not a member of the military; and he was imprisoned during a time
when the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana convened and adjourned. Id.
74. Id. at 120-21. However, the Court also recognized that military tribunals, during
times of war, are sometimes necessary:
It is essential to the safety of every government that, in a great crisis, like
the [Civil War], there should be a power somewhere of suspending the
writ of habeas corpus. In every war, there are men ... wicked enough to
counsel their fellow-citizens to resist the measures deemed necessary by a
good government to sustain its just authority and overthrow its enemies;
and their influence may lead to dangerous combinations. In the emergency
of the times, an immediate [jury trial] may not be possible; and yet, the
peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at
large. Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the
government, if it should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion to
make arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested in
answer to a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 125-26.
75. 317 U.S. I (1942).
76. See id. The Court viewed the issues raised by petitioners to be of such "public
importance" that it granted certiorari and convened during an unscheduled "special" term. Id.
at 19.
77. Id. at 21. Petitioners were born in Germany. Id. at 20. During WWII, petitioners
boarded a submarine-stocked with explosives-landed on Long Island, NY, changed into
civilian attire, and traveled to New York City. Petitioners then boarded another submarine that
they navigated to Florida. Petitioners had instructions from high-ranking German military
officials to destroy strategic military facilities in the United States. In exchange, their families
in Germany were to receive compensation. Id. at 21.
78. Id. at 21.
79. Id. at 22. On July 2, 1942, President Roosevelt declared that
[A]II persons who are subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war
with the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction
of any such nation and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter
the United States .. . through coastal or boundary defenses, and are
charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit sabotage,
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President Roosevelt declared that petitioners were denied access to
federal courts. 8°  Petitioners argued that the President lacked
constitutional authority to establish the military tribunals, they had a
right to a jury trial under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and that the
President's order, which "prescrib[ed]" the procedure, method of
review, and sentencing requirements of the commission, conflicted
with Congress' adoption of the Articles of War.8 1 The Court
distinguished Quirin from Milligan, holding that this military
commission had jurisdiction, 82 petitioners were unlawful enemy
"belligerents" and therefore had no right to a civilian trial by jury
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and, lastly, the President had
authority to order trial by military commission. 84 The Court concluded
that the petitioners' detainment was lawful and thus denied their
petition for habeas corpus.
85
In 1950, five years after the end of WWII, the Court again
denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Johnson v.
Eisentrager.86 Petitioners were twenty-one German nationals stationed
in China who continued to aid Japan after Germany surrendered from
WWI[. 87 Petitioners were arrested, but unlike petitioners in Milligan
and Quirin, were tried before an extraterritorial military tribunal in
espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be
subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.
Id. at 22-23.
80. Id. at 23.
81. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24. The Articles of War are the predecessors to the modern day
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE, available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/UCMJ_summary.pdf. The UCMJ is the statutory
authority that governs military justice. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-18506 (2006).
82. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
83. Id. at 44-45; contra Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121-22 (1942) (holding that
military tribunals cannot preside over civilian cases where civilian courts are open).
84. Id at 48.
[T]he detention and trial of petitioners-ordered by the President in the
declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in
time of war and of grave public danger-are not to be set aside by the
courts without the clear conviction that they are in conflict with the
Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally enacted.
Id. at 25.
85. Id. at 48. The Court reached a similar conclusion in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 25
(1946) (holding that the Executive had legal authority to try petitioner-the commanding
general of the Japanese armed forces-by military commission).
86. See 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
87. Id. at 765-66. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945. Id. Japan had yet to surrender.
Petitioners relayed intelligence information with regard to American troop movements to
Japan. Id. at 766.
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Nanking, China. 88  The District Court of the District of Columbia
dismissed the petition. 89 The Court of Appeals reversed and held that
"any person who is deprived of his liberty by officials of the United
States, acting under purported authority of that Government, and who
can show that his confinement is in violation of a prohibition of the
Constitution, has a right to the writ [of habeas corpus]." 90 The Court
of Appeals continued that although jurisdiction is not authorized
through any statute, the courts should hold it as part of a "judicial
power.
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court questioned how
petitioners were privileged to the constitutional right of the writ of
habeas corpus when petitioners were enemy aliens, never in the United
States, being held as prisoners of war outside the United States, and
convicted by a military commission presiding overseas and for
violating laws of war.92 The Supreme Court stated that the Court of
Appeals "gave our Constitution an extraterritorial application to
embrace our enemies in arms."93 The Court then held that the
Constitution does not immunize enemy aliens from trial by military
commissions or punishment when their countries are at war with the
United States.94 Further, the Court held that petitioners failed to show
that the military commissions lacked jurisdiction. 95
88. Id. at 766; see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 107 (1866) (noting that petitioner's
military tribunal presided in the State of Indiana); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 23
(1942) (noting that petitioners' military tribunal presided in Washington, DC). The tribunal
was authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
89. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767. Petitioners argued that their trial, conviction, and
detention were unconstitutional under Article 1, Article I11, and the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution, and in violation of the Geneva Convention. Id.
90. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
91. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 767.
92. Id. at 777.
93. Id. at 781.
94. Id. at 785.
95. Id. at 790.
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B. Jurisprudence Regarding the Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals
and Habeas Corpus Rights of Detainees After
September 11, 2001
After the September 11 attacks, Congress passed the
96Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). The AUMF stated
that:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations,
or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred
on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations
or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons.
97
After United States intelligence determined that al Qaeda was
responsible for the attacks, President George W. Bush commanded the
United States Armed Forces to infiltrate Afghanistan pursuant to the
authorization. During this armed conflict, the United States captured
several foreign nationals and detained them at GTMO.99 On November
13, 2001, President Bush gave an executive order authorizing the trial
of al Qaeda members through military commission at "any place" the
Secretary of Defense determined, including GTMO. 00 In this order,
the President invoked his power under 10 U.S.C. §836101 and stated
that the general principles of law and evidence rules that apply in
96. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (granting the President authorization to
use force against those responsible for the September II attacks). The bill was passed on
September 18, 2001. Id.
97. Id. Congress justified this authorization in the bill by stating that the United States
must "exercise its right to self-defense" and that acts of terrorism "pose an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." Id.
98. See Letter from John D. Negroponte, U.S. Rep. to the U.N., to President of the Sec.
Council (Oct. 7, 2001), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G EN/NO1/567/85/PDF/NO156785.pdf.OpenElement
(alerting the United Nations of the intent of the United States to infiltrate Afghanistan as an
exercise of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter). After the September 11
attacks, the United States requested that the Taliban hand over members of al Qaeda. Ahmad,
supra note 19, at 5. Only after the Taliban refused did the United States invade Afghanistan on
October 7, 2001. Id. at 5-6.
99. See Detainee List, supra note 16.
100. See Military Order No. 3 C.F.R. 918 (Nov. 16, 2001).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2006) (stating that the President may prescribe the procedures of
military commissions).
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typical criminal cases in district courts will not apply to the military
commissions. 102
One of the first GTMO detention cases heard in the Supreme
Court was Rasul v. Bush. 10 3 Petitioners included two Australians and
twelve Kuwaitis, whom the United States captured during armed
conflict with the Taliban. 104 The two Australians invoked their right to
a writ of habeas corpus while the Kuwaitis asserted causes of action
under three federal statues, including the general habeas corpus statute,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43.105 The District Court dismissed the actions and
the Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Eisentrager.10 6 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and distinguished Rasul from Eisentrager by
noting that the detainees in Rasul were not nationals of a country at
war with the United States, denied participation in an act of aggression
against the U.S., had never gone before a tribunal, had never been
charged, and "for more than two years, [the detainees] ha[d] been
imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and control."' 1 7 The Court held that 28 U.S.C. §
2241 grants the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia with jurisdiction over the "custodians" of the detainees, and
therefore, jurisdiction to hear the detainees' habeas corpus actions.' 08
102. Military Order No. 3 C.F.R. 918 (Nov. 16, 2001). The military commissions allowed
for the admissibility of hearsay. See infra note 169 and accompanying text. Hearsay is,
"[tlraditionally, testimony that is given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows
personally, but what others have said, and that is therefore dependent on the credibility of
someone other than the witness." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (8th ed. 2004).
103. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
104. Id. at 470. Relatives of the petitioners filed the action with the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. Id. at 471.
105. Id. at 472. The Kuwaitis also asserted causes of action under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555, 702, 706, and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Moreover, the "Kuwaiti detainees filed a complaint seeking to be informed of the charges
against them, to be allowed to meet with their families and with counsel, and to have access to
the courts or some other impartial tribunal." Id.
106. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472-73; see supra Part Il.A.
107. Id. at 476.
108. Id. at 483-84.
[P]ersons detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district
court no longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of their right to
federal habeas review. In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410
U.S. 484, 495 (1973), this Court held ... that the prisoner's presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is not "an invariable
prerequisite" to the exercise of district court jurisdiction under the federal
habeas statute. Rather, because "the writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in
what is alleged to be unlawful custody," a district court acts "within [its]
respective jurisdiction" within the meaning of § 2241 as long as "the
custodian can be reached by service of process."
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On the same day as Rasul, the Court also decided Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.'°9 In Hamdi, the Court questioned the constitutionality of
the United States Government's detention of a U.S. citizen as an
"enemy combatant" on U.S. soil.1'0 The petitioner, Yaser Esam
Hamdi, is a United States citizen.'' However, petitioner relocated to
Afghanistan where he allegedly became a member of the Taliban.1 12
After being captured by troops of the Northern Alliance of
Afghanistan, a U.S. ally, petitioner was detained at GTMO.' '" When it
was determined that he is a U.S. citizen, Hamdi was eventually
transferred to a prison in Charleston, South Carolina." 4  Though the
district court granted petitioner access to an attorney,' '5 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court did not appropriately consider the government's security
interests. 1  The Court of Appeals subsequently determined that
because petitioner was "captured in a zone of active combat in a
foreign [nation]," the habeas petition should be dismissed' '7 and that
Id. at 478-79.
109. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
110. Id. at 509. Another Supreme Court case questioning the constitutionality of the
United States Government's detention of a U.S. citizen as an "enemy combatant" on U.S. soil
was Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). In Padilla, the Court ruled in favor of the Bush
Administration, finding that Padilla should have brought his case in South Carolina instead of
New York. Id. at 451. However, the Bush Administration's victory was merely procedural.
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 233 (2007).
111. Id. Hamdi was born in Louisiana in 1980. As a child, Hamdi moved to Saudi Arabia.
Id. at 510.
112. Id. at 510. Hamdi allegedly "affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received
weapons training." Id. at 513. Upon capture, Hamdi "surrender[ed] his Kalishnikov assault
rifle." Id.
113. ld at 510.
114. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. Hamdi was transferred to a naval brig in Norfolk, VA
before his detention in Charleston, SC. Id. Petitioner's father filed a habeas corpus petition. ld
at 511. The petition asked the Court to (1) appoint counsel; (2) order the Government to stop
interrogating Hamdi; (3) declare that Hamdi's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated; (4) order an evidentiary hearing; and (5) order the release of Hamdi. Id
115. Id. at512.
116. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4 h Cir. 2002). After reviewing the
Government's response motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to determine
the sufficiency of the Government's argument. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 513 (2004).
The District Court characterized petitioner's under-oath statement as hearsay and ordered the
production of evidence necessary for "meaningful judicial review." Evidence to be produced
included Hamdi's statements, notes taken during Hamdi's interviews, the interviewers' contact
information, statements by the Northern Alliance troops who captured Hamdi, and names and
titles of the Government officials who determined that Hamdi was an "enemy combatant." ld
at 513-14.
117. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F,3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003). The Court of Appeals stated
that because "Article 111 [which enumerates the powers of the Supreme Court] contains
nothing analogous to the specific powers of war so carefully enumerated in Articles I and I1
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the AUMF authorized petitioner's detainment.'' 8 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and held that "although Congress authorized
[through the AUMF] the detention of combatants in the narrow
circumstances alleged [in Hamdi], due process demands that a citizen
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention
before a neutral decisionmaker." 119 The Court concluded its opinion by
suggesting that an authorized tribunal-like a Combatant Status Review
Tribunal (CSRT)-may satisfy due process demands.120
On July 7, 2004, approximately a week after the Hamdi
decision, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld responded by
establishing CSRTs.' 21 CSRTs determined if detainees held at GTMO
were "enemy combatants." 122 Each CSRT was comprised of three
neutral United States military officers, including one judge
advocate. 123 Each detainee was assigned a military officer as a
"personal representative" and was allowed to testify, call witnesses,
[which enumerate the powers of Congress and the President respectfully]," the courts are
"prohibited" from questioning Hamdi's detention further. Id. at 463.
118. Id. at 467. The Court of Appeals also rejected Hamdi's reliance on Ex parte Quirin
stating that "[o]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war,
regardless of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as
such." Id. at 475.
119. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. Petitioner argued that his detention was illegal under 18
U.S.C. § 4001 (a), which states that -[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by
the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress." Id. at 517. The Court recognized
that though indefinite imprisonment for the purposes of interrogation is not authorized, the
United States may detain members of the Taliban who engaged in armed hostilities against the
United States for the duration of the conflict in Afghanistan, pursuant to the AUMF. Id. at 521.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument that "respect for separation
of powers" should discourage the Court from questioning the constitutionality of the detention
of enemy combatants. Id. at 527, 533. The Court employed the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) balancing test in accepting Hamdi's argument that he is entitled to fact-finding
proceeding before a neutral tribunal. Id. at 529. "Mathews dictates that the process due in any
given instance is determined by weighing 'the private interest that will be affected by the
official action' against the Government's asserted interest." Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at
335). In her plurality opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated "[The Supreme Court has]
long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes
to the rights of the Nation's citizens." Id. at 536.
120. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538. The Court stated that "[a]n interrogation by one's
captor, however effective an intelligence-gathering tool, hardly constitutes a constitutionally
adequate factfinding before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 537.
121. See Wolfowitz, supra note 21.
122. Id.
123. Id A judge advocate is an attorney in the armed forces. See, e.g., United States
Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps, http://www.jag.navy.mil/; United States Marine
Corps Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant,
http://www.marines.mil/unitljudgeadvocate/Pages/Home/SJA-to-the CMC.aspx.
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and introduce evidence before the CSRT.124 The three officers
presiding on the CSRT then determined if the detainee was an "enemy
combatant" or should be deported to their country of citizenship. 
2 5
Congress also responded to the Supreme Court's decision in
Hamdi by passing the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) in 2005. 126 The
DTA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas actions by
GTMO detainees:
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the
United States who has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy
combatant or is awaiting such determination.'
27
Further, the DTA granted the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit "exclusive jurisdiction" over
CSRT decisions regarding the proper detention of an "enemy
combatant."' 2 8
Despite Congress' enactment of the DTA, the Supreme Court
decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld in June 2006.129 Petitioner, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan, was captured in Afghanistan in November 2001."3 Three
years later, petitioner was charged while detained at GTMO with
conspiracy "to commit ... offenses triable by military commission." 
1 3 1
124. Wolfowitz, supra note 21.
125. Id.
126. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2741-43 (2006).
127. Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (e) (2006).
128. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276 (2008). The jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was limited to the consideration of whether the final determinations made by the
CSRTs were in accordance with the procedures set forth by the Secretary of Defense and the
Constitution of the United States. 10 U.S.C. §801 (2006).
129. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
130. Id. at 566. Hamdan is a citizen of Yemen. Id.
131. Id. Hamdan's charging document contained 13 paragraphs. The first two paragraphs
explained the military tribunal's jurisdiction. The next nine paragraphs detailed al Qaeda's
actions through 2001 and listed Osama bin Laden as al Qaeda's leader. Id. at 569. Paragraph
12 stated that Hamdan "willfully and knowingly joined an enterprise of persons who shared a
common criminal purpose and conspired and agreed with [named members of al Qaeda] to
commit the following offenses triable by military commission: attacking civilians; attacking
civilian objects; murder by an unprivileged belligerent; and terrorism." Id. at 569-70.
Paragraph 13 lists four specific allegations:
(1) he acted as Usama bin Laden's "bodyguard and personal driver,"
"believ[ing]" all the while that bin Laden "and his associates were
involved in" terrorist acts prior to and including the attacks of September
I1, 2001; (2) he arranged for transportation of, and actually transported,
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Petitioner argued that the CSRT that the executive branch established
lacked authority because no statute or case law supported trial by
commission for a conspiracy charge, and the CSRT's procedures,
which disallow the defendant to hear incriminating evidence, violated
the Uniform Code of Military Justice 132  and the Geneva
Conventions 33.134 Though the District Court granted petitioner a writ
for habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals reversed. 135 After the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in November 2005,136 the Government filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction
to review the appeal as a result of the DTA. 137 However, the Court
rejected the Government's DTA argument 138  and agreed with
petitioner that his tribunal's procedures violated military and
international law.' 39 The Court held that the DTA's jurisdiction-
weapons used by al Qaeda members and by bin Laden's bodyguards
(Hamdan among them); (3) he "drove or accompanied Usama bin Laden
to various al Qaida-sponsored training camps, press conferences, or
lectures," at which bin Laden encouraged attacks against Americans; and
(4) he received weapons training at al Qaeda-sponsored camps.
Id. at 570.
132. See UCMJ, supra note 81.
133. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 707 (8th ed. 2004) ("[l]ntemational agreements
dealing with the ... treatment of prisoners of war ... Common Article 3 of the Conventions
proclaims certain minimum standards of treatment that are applicable to noninternational
armed conflicts.").
134. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
135. Id. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the District Court by holding that Hamdan
was not entitled to protection under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. Id. at 571. The Court
of Appeals also held that Hamdan's trial before a military tribunal was not a violation of the
UCMJ. Id. at 572.
136. Id. at572.
137. Id. at 572. In his dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with the Government that the DTA
strips the Supreme Court's jurisdiction in this case. Id. at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 575-84. The Court stated that "the Government has identified
no . . . 'important countervailing interest' that would permit federal courts to depart from their
general 'duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress."' Id at 589
(quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). The Court also rejected
the Government's argument that even if the Court has jurisdiction, civilian courts should wait
for the completion of the military proceeding before attacking the proceeding. Id at 584-85.
139. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567. In Part V of the Hamdan opinion, the Court also held that
a military tribunal may not try a conspiracy charge. Id. The Court stated that neither the
AUMF nor the DTA authorized the President to convene military tribunals outside those
authorized and enumerated in Article 21 of the UCMJ. Id. at 593-94.
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stripping language had no effect on pending cases.140 Hamdan's case
was remanded to the lower civilian court for further proceedings. '41
In response to the holding in Hamdan, Congress amended the
DTA with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). 142 President
George W. Bush signed the MCA on October 17, 2006. "' Once again,
through Section 7(b) of the MCA, Congress denied federal courts
jurisdiction over "enemy combatant" habeas actions by stating that the
MCA took effect immediately, and applied to "all cases, without
exception, pending on or after the date of the enactment of this
[Military Commissions] Act which relate to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an
alien detained by the United States since September 11, 200 L.
''44
IIl. THE COURT'S REASONING
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Boumediene that the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) "strips" jurisdiction over petitioners' habeas
actions from all federal courts'45 and that the Suspension Clause in
Article 1, Section 9 of the United States Constitution is in effect at the
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). 146 Furthermore, the
Court held that Congress did not provide an adequate and effective
substitute for habeas corpus in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA),
thereby rendering MCA § 7 an unconstitutional suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, 147 and that detainees need not wait for the
140. 1d. at 575-76 ("Ordinary principles of statutory construction suffice to rebut the
Government's theory-at least insofar as this case, which was pending at the time the DTA was
enacted, is concerned.").
141. Id. at 635. However, the Court recognized Hamdan's dangerous character and the
risk that he posed to innocent civilians. Hamdan remained detained at GTMO. Id. at 635.
142. See Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. The MCA "authorize[d] trial by military
commission for violations of the laws of war, and for other purposes." Id. Additionally, the
MCA (I) defined "lawful enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy combatant;" (2)
established procedures for military tribunals; (3) stated that no unlawful enemy combatant
"subject to trial by military commission under [the MCA] may invoke the Geneva
Conventions as a source of rights;" (4) stated that a finding by a CSRT that a detainee is an
unlawful enemy combatant is "dispositive" for purposes of jurisdiction for a military tribunal;
and (5) allowed military tribunals to impose any non-forbidden punishment, including the
death penalty. Id. at 2601-03.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 2636 (emphasis added).
145. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2244 (2008).
146. Id. at 2262. The Suspension Clause prohibits the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus unless during times of rebellion or invasion. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
147. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274. The Court of Appeals did not address whether the
DTA provided an adequate substitute for habeas corpus. Id. at 2262; see supra text
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completion of review from the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) in the Court of Appeals before bringing a habeas action in
district court.
148
In holding that the MCA strips federal courts of jurisdiction
over petitioners' habeas actions, the Court rejected petitioners'
argument that the MCA is not a clear declaration of the legislature's
intent to strip jurisdiction from federal courts in pending cases. 149
Instead, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in
recognizing that Congress passed the MCA as a direct result of the
holding in Hamdan15  and stated that, "[Congress'] intent must be
respected even if a difficult constitutional question is presented."
' 151
Next, the Court held that the Suspension Clause has full effect
at GTMO. 152 The Court determined that neither petitioners' status as
"enemy combatants" nor their physical location in Cuba prevents their
ability to seek the writ of habeas corpus. 153 In so holding, the Court
first rejected the Government's contention that "enemy combatants"
are not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus after making a historical
analysis dating back to the Framers of the Constitution; the Court
concluded that the right to habeas corpus is one of the fundamental
principles that ensure liberty in the United States. 54 The Court noted
that the Suspension Clause limits abuse of habeas corpus rights by the
political branches and promotes "judicial inquiry" into causes of
accompanying note 47. Typically, the Supreme Court sends unaddressed issues back to the
lower courts. However, the Supreme Court determined this case to be "exceptional," taking
into consideration the length of time the detainees had been imprisoned. Id. at 2262.
148. Id. at 2275.
149. Id. at 2243-44. Petitioners' argument is based on a textual interpretation of the
MCA. Id. at 2243.
150. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
151. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2243-44.
152. Id. at 2262. "The [Suspension] Clause protects the rights of the detained by
affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call the jailer to account." Id. at 2247.
153. Id. at 2262.
154. Id. at 2244 ("The Framers viewed freedom from unlawful restraint as a fundamental
precept of liberty, and they understood the writ of habeas corpus as a vital instrument to secure
that freedom."). Alexander Hamilton once wrote:
[T]he practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny. The observations of
the judicious Blackstone ... are well worthy of recital: "To bereave a man
of life ... without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an
act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout
the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him
to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a
less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
government."
Id. at 2247 (quoting The FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton)).
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imprisonment.155 Next, the Court rejected the Government's argument
that the United States does not claim sovereignty 156 over GTMO. 157 In
rejecting the Government's argument, the Court compared the GTMO
lease to the acquisition of territories such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and
Hawaii1 58 and stated that "[t]he Constitution grants Congress and the
President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the
power to decide when and where [the Constitution's] terms apply.' ' 59
The Court also distinguished GTMO detainees,'60 detention sites,
1 61
and practical concerns from those in Eisentrager-the case on which
the lower appellate court relied. 1
62
Third, in holding that the DTA does not provide an adequate
substitute for habeas corpus thereby rendering the MCA
unconstitutional, the Court stated that it considers "it
uncontroversial ... that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the
prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being
held pursuant to 'the erroneous application or interpretation' of
relevant law."' 6 3 The Court also stated that the habeas court must have
the power to release the prisoner if it determines the imprisonment is
unlawful.1 64 Though the Court acknowledged that deference is
typically owed to a court of record that sentences a detainee to
prison, 16 5 it distinguished a court of record from the executive order
that commanded the petitioners' detention in the present case. 166 The
Court noted that the need for habeas corpus is greater where detention
is pursuant to an executive order. 1
67
155. Id. at 2246-47.
156. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004) ("Supreme dominion, authority,
or rule.").
157. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248-62. The Court stated that the United States
"maintains de facto sovereignty over [GTMO]." Id. at 2253.
158. Id. at 2253.
159. Id. at 2259.
160. Id. In Eisentrager, the detainees did not dispute the Government's labeling of them
as "enemy aliens," unlike the present case, in which the detainees dispute being "enemy
combatants." 1d.
161. Id. at 2260 ("Unlike its present control over the naval station [at GTMO], the United
States' control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefinite.").
162. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2261 ("Habeas corpus proceedings may require
expenditure of funds by the Government and may divert the attention of military personnel
from other pressing tasks. While we are sensitive to these concerns, we do not find them
dispositive.").
163. Id. at 2266 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2268.
166. Id.
167. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269.
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Accordingly, the Court reviewed CSRT procedures and
accepted petitioners' argument that CSRTs are deficient fact-finding
forums. 168The Court criticized that a GTMO detainee is limited in his
ability to find or present evidence to rebut the Government's case,
does not have an attorney present to explain allegations or present
exculpatory evidence, and is not protected by the evidence rules that
prohibit hearsay 69 . 170 The Court stated that:
[E]ven when all the parties involved in this process act
with diligence and in good faith, there is considerable
risk of error in the tribunal's findings of fact. This is a
risk inherent in any process that, in the words of the
former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, is "closed
and accusatorial" (citation omitted). And given that the
consequence of error may be detention of persons for
the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or
more, this is a risk too significant to ignore.'
7 1
The Court concluded that the DTA does not allow petitioners
to challenge the President's authority to detain them indefinitely under
the AUMF,' 72 the Court of Appeals to review evidence outside the
record of the CSRT-evidence that may be exculpatory, 173 or the
petitioner to request release. 174 Therefore, the DTA hinders petitioners'
ability to participate in adequate appellate review, thus renderingMCA
§ 7 an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
168. Id. at 2269-70.
169. See FED. R. EvID. 802. Though the detainee may confront a witness testifying against
him during a CSRT, hearsay is admissible during a CSRT hearing if the tribunal determines
that the testimony is "relevant and helpful." Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269.
170. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2269. The Government's counterargument was that the
CSRTs were established in accordance with the Supreme Court's suggestions detailed in
Hamdi. Id.
171. Id. at 2270.
172. ld. at 2271-72.
173. Id. at 2273. Evidence considered to be outside the record includes evidence obtained
after the CSRT hearing. Exculpatory evidence obtained after the CSRT hearing "may be
critical to the detainee's argument that he is not an enemy combatant and there is no cause to
detain him." Id. The Government argued that if a detainee obtains exculpatory evidence after
his CSRT, the DTA allows the detainee to request that the Deputy Secretary of Defense order
a new tribunal. Since the convening of a new tribunal is at the discretion of the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, however, the Court determined that the current review process is
inadequate. Id.
174. Id. at 2274.
175. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2274.
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Finally, the Court then held that, despite the Government's
interpretation of the DTA, petitioners may bypass CSRT review in the
Court of Appeals and bring habeas actions immediately in district
court. 176 In making this holding, the Court considered the several years
these detainees have been imprisoned, 177 and the unresponsiveness of
the Court of Appeals to process the CSRT reviews. 17However, the
Court also noted that the Executive is still permitted reasonable time to
determine the detainee's status at a CSRT before a detainee can file a
habeas corpus petition. 179
In his dissent, Justice Scalia asserted that the majority
erroneously violated the precedent set forth in Eisentrager."8 ° Scalia
stated that Eisentrager "held-held beyond any doubt-that the
Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United
States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign."'' The
Justice continued that "[tihe writ of habeas corpus does not, and never
has, run in favor of aliens abroad; the Suspension Clause thus has no
application [at GTMO], and the Court's intervention in this military
matter is entirely [beyond the Court's power]."'' 82 Throughout his
176. Id. at 2275.
177. Id. ("In some of these cases six years have elapsed without the judicial oversight that
habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands ... To require these detainees to complete
DTA review before proceeding with their habeas corpus actions would be to require additional
months, if not years of delay.").
178. Id.
179. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2276. The Court concluded the majority opinion with
dictum: "In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose
detention to prevent acts of terrorism, proper deference must be accorded to the political
branches." id. at 2276 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
320 (1936)). The Court then noted that "few exercises ofjudicial power are as legitimate or as
necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison
a person." Id. at 2277.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, stated that "legislation
eliminated the statutory habeas jurisdiction over the [GTMO detention] claims, so that now
there must be constitutionally based jurisdiction or none at all." Id. at 2278 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Additionally, after considering the length of the petitioners' detention, Souter
rejected the dissents argument that "these cases should be seen as a judicial victory in a contest
for power between the Court and the political branches." Id. at 2278-79 ("[T]oday's decision
is no judicial victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas reviews, and the
obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to prisoners and to the
Nation.").
180. Id. at 2298-99.
181. Id.; see supra Part II.A. Scalia notes that the majority "admits that it cannot
determine whether the writ [of habeas corpus] historically extended to aliens held abroad, and
it concedes (necessarily) that Guantanamo Bay lies outside the sovereign territory of the
United States." Id. at 2297.
182. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Alito, and Justice Thomas joined Scalia's dissent. Id.
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dissent, Scalia criticized that the majority's opinion decreases the
security of U.S. soldiers by allowing GTMO detainees to return to the
field of battle,183 and foolishly places the authority over enemy
prisoners in the hands of the judiciary instead of the political
branches.184 Moreover, he complained that the majority irrationally
provided more judicial remedy for enemy prisoners detained in areas
of U.S. control than enemies sentenced to death 185 and established "an
inflated notion of judicial supremacy."' 8 6
In reaching his conclusions, Scalia focused on what he called
the "legal errors" of the majority opinion.' However, Scalia's
analysis of the "legal errors" opens with the following narrative:
America is at war with radical Islamists. The enemy
began by killing Americans and American allies
abroad: 241 at the Marine barracks in Lebanon, 19 at
the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, 224 at our embassies in
Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and 17 on the USS Cole in
Yemen (citation omitted). On September 11, 2001, the
enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749
at the Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the
Pentagon in Washington, D. C., and 40 in Pennsylvania
(citation omitted). It has threatened further attacks
against our homeland; one need only walk about
buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane
anywhere in the country, to know that the threat is a
serious one. Our Armed Forces are now in the field
183. Id. at 2294-95 ("At least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo
Bay have returned to the battlefield ... [One] former detainee promptly resumed his post as a
senior Taliban commander and murdered a United Nations engineer... [Another] released
detainee carried out a suicide bombing against Iraqi soldiers ....").
184. Id. at 2296 ("Henceforth, as today's [majority] opinion makes unnervingly clear,
how to handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the [judicial] branch that
knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.").
185. Id. at 2302. Scalia writes:
The Court's analysis produces a crazy result: Whereas those convicted and
sentenced to death for war crimes are without judicial remedy, all enemy
combatants detained during a war, at least insofar as they are confined in
an area away from the battlefield over which the United States exercises
"absolute and indefinite" control, may seek a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court.
Id.
186. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302.
187. Id. at 2294.
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against the enemy, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Last week,
13 of our countrymen in arms were killed. 188
IV. ANALYSIS
Justice Scalia's choice of language in the beginning of his
dissent suggests that his opinion is fueled by fear of an unfamiliar race
with unique religious practices. 189 His demonstrated fear may not be
unfounded, especially after the attacks that took place on September
11, 2001.19° However, the demonstration of fear of an unfamiliar race
or religion is unprecedented in previous habeas corpus jurisprudence-
including Scalia's previous dissents in Guantanamo detention habeas
corpus cases. 19 1 Scalia may have included this fearful language as a
last-ditch effort- after taking into consideration the long line of GTMO
habeas corpus jurisprudence-to influence the courts' future habeas
corpus opinions to subscribe to his conservative viewpoint.' 
92
188. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts' dissent, joined by Justice
Scalia, states that the DTA system for testing the legality of the detainees' imprisonment at
GTMO created by the political branches adequately protects constitutional rights of detainees.
Id. at 2280. Robert's contends that the majority's refusal to force petitioners to exhaust their
statutory remedies, places the Court in the awkward position of prematurely deciding whether
the DTA extends habeas corpus rights to the GTMO detainees, when the system the political
branches created would answer that same question in due time. Id. at 2283. Additionally,
Roberts states that the majority fails to articulate the detainees' rights that cannot be preserved
by the DTA system. Id. Roberts adds that the majority is contradicting the plurality opinion in
Hamdi, which states that "enemy combatants" are entitled to limited process-like the process
offered through CSRTs. Id. at 2283.
189. See id. at 2294 ("America is at war with radical Islamists."). Justice Scalia is a
devout Catholic. MARK TuSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED 35 (2005).
190. See infra Part IV.A.
191. See infra Part IV.B. While narratives like Scalia's do not appear in other habeas
corpus cases, other American jurisprudence has surely been influenced by fear of unfamiliar
races and religions. See Geary Act (Chinese Exclusion), 27 Stat. 25 (1892) ("An act to prohibit
the coming of Chinese persons into the United States."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 215-16, 224 (1944) (affirming the conviction of an American citizen of Japanese
ancestry who violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34-excluding persons of Japanese descent
from "military areas"); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding the
constitutionality of segregation in public rail cars that are "separate but equal"); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 153 (1878) (affirming the conviction of a polygamist despite
evidence of a partial jury and the defendant's belief that plural marriage was his religious
duty).
192. See infra Part IV.C. Mark Tushnet questions Scalia's intelligence and criticizes his
writing style. See TUSHNET, supra note 189 at 148-49.
[Scalia's opinions are] strongly stated, [use] catchy examples and phrases,
and cast aspersions on his opponents' honesty. He had familiarized
himself with that style as a member of the editorial board of the magazine
Regulation ... Regulation's articles were designed to catch readers'
attention with horror stories. . . The articles' real audience was opinion
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A. Scalia's Fear of an Unfamiliar Race and Religion May Not be
Unfounded
Perhaps Scalia's narrative is not completely unfounded. On
September 11, 2001, radical Islamists hijacked four airplanes used as
weapons during a terrorist attack against the United States, killing
approximately 3,000 innocent people. 93 Some authors suggest that the
hijackers were exercising their religious beliefs through "jihad."' 194
One interpretation of the language of the Qur'an, the Islamic
scripture, 95would suggest that "jihad"' 96 is a violent exercise of
makers who would read not the articles themselves but the summaries that
appeared in leading newspapers, summaries that predictably focused on
the horror stories and played down the typically more complicated and
qualified academic analysis. Some law professors and an even larger
number of journalists praised Scalia for his literary style. That style isn't
as distinctive as it seems at first. Certainly it's distinctive among Supreme
Court justices. But everyone has heard Scalia's style. It's the sound bite
style of Crossfire, highly quotable, reducing complex issues to simple-and
often misleading-phrases.
Id.
193. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).
194. See Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. "Dutch" Bialke, AI-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful
Combatant Detainees, Unlawful Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict,
55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 39 ("AI-Qaeda has shown that it is ready and willing to use all means
necessary throughjihad, an Islamic holy war, to achieve its stated theocratic-political Islamist
vision."); Lawrence Wright, The Master Plan, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/09/11/06091 Ifafact3 (suggesting that al Qaeda is
just the beginning in the minds ofjihad theorists).
195. See 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 866 (15th ed. 1993) ("[The Qur'an is] the sacred
scripture of Islam, regarded by Muslims as the infallible Word of God ... Qur'anic recitation
has always been an important aspect of Muslim piety. As the paramount authority for the
Muslim community, the Qur'an is the ultimate source and continual inspiration of Islam.").
196. See MUHAMMAD M. PICKTHALL, THE GLORIOUS QUR'AN 754 (1977) (defining jihad
as fighting or striving).
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religious faith,197 while another interpretation would suggest quite the
contrary. 198
For instance, one passage from the Qur'an suggests that jihad
is a violent calling:
Fight against ... those who have been given the
[Islamic] Scripture [and] believe not in Allah [the
Islamic God] nor the Last Day, and forbid not that
which Allah hath forbidden by His messenger
[Mohammed], and follow not the [Muslim] religion of
truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought
low. 1
9 9
Furthermore, another passage reads, "[w]hoso fighteth [on
behalf] of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, on him We shall
bestow a vast reward.,
200
Contrarily, another passage suggests that jihad is not an
aggressive violence, stating "[flight in the way of Allah against those
who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not
aggressors. ' 201 This passage implies that jihad is only practiced as a
self-defense method and that aggression is frowned upon within the
202Islamic faith. Meanwhile, other passages from the Qur'an
regarding jihad are rather vague and could imply that the words "fight"
or "strive," as used in the scripture, only propose that followers of
197. See id. at 196 ("0 ye who believe! Fight those of the disbelievers who are near to
you, and let them find harshness in you, and know that Allah is with those who keep their duty
(unto Him)."). Another passage from the Qur'an reads:
Now when ye meet in battle those who disbelieve [in Islam], then it is
smiting of the necks until, when ye have routed them, then making fast of
bonds; and afterward either grace or ransom till the war lay down its
burdens. That (is the ordinance). And if Allah willed He could have
punished them (without you) but (thus it is ordained) that He may try
some of you by means of others. And those who fought in the way of
Allah, He rendereth not their actions vain.
Id. at 553.
198. See id. at 173 (suggesting that if the enemy ceases, followers of Islam should stop
aggression); see also id. at 343 (suggesting that fighting is only appropriate in cases of self-
defense).
This paper takes no position on the true definition of jihad. Readers are left to interpret the
scripture themselves. Nor does this paper, by any means, intend to suggest that all Muslims
exercise their faith in the same manner. This section is only intended to lay a foundation for
the possible source of fear seemingly demonstrated in Scalia's dissent in Bournediene.
199. Id. at 182.
200. Id. at 85.
201. PICKTHALL, supra note 196, at 190 (emphasis added).
202. See supra text accompanying note 201.
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Islam should resist disbelievers by continuing to have faith in Allah
and Muhammad, the Muslim prophet.2 °3
B. Fear of Unfamiliar Races and Religions Has Not Jnfluenced
Previous Habeas Corpus Jurisprudence-Even Scalia's
Previous Dissents
Little, if any, evidence exists to support that habeas corpus
cases before the September 11 attacks were influenced by fear of
unfamiliar races or religious practices.204  The opinion in Ex parte
Milligan made no mention of the petitioner's race or religion, probably
because petitioner was a Caucasian United States citizen. 205 Likewise,
though petitioners in Ex parte Quirin and Eisentrager were of German
descent and denied the right to the writ of habeas corpus, neither
opinion seems influenced by fear of an unfamiliar race or religious
practice. 206  In fact, in Eisentrager, the Court stated that the
"provisions [of the United States Constitution] are universal in their
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the
United States], without regard to any differences of race, of color, or
of nationality .... The majority opinions in Quirin and
Eisentrager denied petitioners the right to the writ of habeas corpus
not because petitioners were German or Christian, but because the
United States was at war with Germany during WWII and petitioners
were determined to be "enemy belligerents."
20 8
Habeas corpus jurisprudence post-September 11, 2001 does
not, on its face, appear to be influenced by fear of unfamiliar races and
religious practice either. On its face, the passing of the Authorization
for Use of Military Force appears to be motivated only by self-
203. See PICKTHALL, supra note 196, at 375 ("So obey not the disbelievers [of the Muslim
faith], but strive against them herewith with a great endeavor.").
204. See supra Part II.A.
205. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 108 (1866).
206. See supra Part iI.A. Germans are primarily Christian, divided equally between
Protestants and Roman Catholics. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 217 (15th ed. 1993).
207. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
208. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31(1942) ("Unlawful combatants are ... subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military
tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful."); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 785 (1950) ("We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right of personal security or
an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy engaged in the hostile
service of a government at war with the United States.").
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defense, 20 9 and not fear of an unfamiliar race or religious practice. In
President George W. Bush's executive order establishing military
commissions for the GTMO detainees, he actually protects against
racial and religious classifications by stating that any individual
subject to his order shall be "treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction based on race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any
similar criteria." 210 The majority opinion in Rasul was in favor of the
Australian and Kuwaiti petitioners, and made no mention of
petitioners' religious practices; 21 the same is true for the majority
opinion in Hamdi, despite petitioner's connection to Afghanistan and
Saudi Arabia-the historical home of Islam.21 2 Likewise, the Detainee
Treatment Act prevents federal courts from having jurisdiction over
habeas corpus actions of GTMO detainees classified as enemy
combatants, but makes no mention of race or religious belief;213 and
the holding in Hamdan was in favor of petitioner, despite his Middle
Eastern origin. 2 14 Arguably, the Military Commissions Act (MCA)
targets people of Afghan and Islamic descent because the MCA
specifically highlights that members of the Taliban and al Qaeda are
209. See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (200 1) (granting the President authorization to
use force against those responsible for the September II attacks); see also note 97 and
accompanying text.
210. Military Order No. 3 C.F.R. 918 (Nov. 16, 2001). President Bush also "allowed the
free exercise of religion consistent with the requirements of such detention." Id
211. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (granting jurisdiction to preside over
petitioners' habeas corpus case to the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia). "Kuwait's population is overwhelmingly Arab and Muslim." 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 50 (1 5 1h ed. 1993).
212. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that a citizen being held in
the United States labeled as an "enemy combatant" has a right to be tried before a neutral
decisionmaker); see also supra note 111-12 and accompanying text. "Saudi Arabia is the
historical home of Islam." 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 473 ( 15th ed. 1993).
213. See Detainee Treatment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006).
214. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575-76 (2006) (holding that the DTA's
jurisdiction stripping language had no effect on pending cases). The Court of Appeals thought
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which grants minimum protections to
individuals not affiliated with a nation that signed the Geneva Convention, does not apply to
Hamdan. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the conflict with al Qaeda, "being 'international
in scope' does not qualify as a 'conflict not of an international character,"' as Article 3
requires. Id at 630 (quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The
Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning by asserting that the commentaries
associated with Common Article 3 make it obvious that the "scope of application" of Article 3
must be wide. Id. at 630-31 (quoting GCIII Commentary 36). To support its assertion, the
Court noted that the drafters of Common Article 3 omitted language from the final version of
Article 3-"especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of religion"-that would
have broadened the scope of Article 3 further. Id. (emphasis added). However, the Court does
not classify Hamdan into one of the three categories that the omitted language enumerates. See
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included in the definition of "unlawful enemy combatant.,
215
However, little, if any, evidence suggests that Congress' intent in
passing the MCA was anything other than to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over GTMO habeas action in response to the Supreme
Court's holding in Hamdan.
2 16
Even in his previous dissents regarding GTMO detainee habeas
corpus actions, Justice Scalia avoided discussing race or religion all
together. In Rasul, Scalia argued that the majority contradicted
precedent in Eisentrager, but limited his discussion to the legal faults
the majority made with respect to the jurisdiction of federal courts
over the detainees' actions. In Hamdi, Scalia argued that for the
American petitioner's detainment to be constitutional, criminal
proceedings must occur or Congress must suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. 2 18 Though Scalia essentially accused Hamdi of treason, he
avoided any discussion of race and religion. 2 19 Finally, in Hamdan,
Justice Scalia argued that the majority's conclusion that the DTA did
not apply to pending cases was "patently erroneous;" 220 that an enemy
alien held outside the United States' jurisdiction has no rights under
the Suspension Clause;22 1 and, lastly, that the military commissions at
GTMO should not be subject to judicial oversight because they have
yet to complete their review. 222 As shown, Scalia did not touch upon
petitioner's race or religious practices.
223
215. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2601 (2006).
216. See Ahmad, supra note 19, at 7.
217. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488-89 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This is an
irresponsible overturning of settled law [in Eisentrager] in a matter of extreme importance to
our forces currently in the field. I would leave it to Congress to change §2241, and dissent
from the Court's unprecedented holding."). Scalia states that the opinion in Rasul "overrules
Eisentrager; [the Rasul] opinion, and [the Rasul] opinion alone, extends the habeas statute, for
the first time, to aliens held beyond the sovereign territory of the Unites States and beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of its courts." Id. at 497.
218. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 573 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 559-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Citizens aiding the enemy have been
treated as traitors subject to the criminal process."). At first glance, it appears that Scalia
actually argued in favor of the American petitioner despite his connection to the Middle East
and practice of Islam. See id. at 573. However, some legal scholars suggest that Scalia wanted
to try Hamdi for treason. See Carl Takei, Terrorizing Justice: An Argument that Plea Bargains
Struck Under the Threat of "Enemy Combatant" Detention Violate the Right to Due Process,
48 B.C. L. Rev. 581, 606 n.144 (2006) ("Yet as Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in
Hamdi, the grounds for designating Hamdi ... as [an enemy combatant] overlapped
significantly with the grounds for prosecuting a citizen for treason.").
220. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 655 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
argued that statutes take "immediate effect in pending cases." Id at 659.
221. Id. at 670.
222. Id. at 673-78.
223. See supra Part II.B.
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C. Scalia May Have Demonstrated His Fear to Influence Future
Habeas Corpus Opinions
Justice Scalia may have demonstrated his fear of an unfamiliar
race and religion in Boumediene in a last-ditch effort to influence
courts to subscribe to hig conservative viewpoint in future habeas
corpus opinions. After a long line of GTMO habeas corpus
jurisprudence, Scalia finally recognized that the majority of the
Supreme Court Justices refuse to take Congress' cue to allow the
political branches to manage the detention of enemy combatants at
Guantanamo Bay.224 As a result, Scalia resorted to a severe departure
from his normal opinion writing practice225 by starting his opinion
with "America is at war with radical [slamists. 226 Perhaps Scalia
demonstrated his own fear with an unfamiliar race and religion in an
effort to strike fear into district court judges who, as a result of the
majority's opinion in Boumediene,227will find themselves presiding
over yet another GTMO habeas corpus case in the near future.
2 2 s
Scalia is afraid that district court judges will subscribe to the
majority's liberal theory in Boumediene, sympathize with the
detainees, and release the detainees from GTMO.2 29 Scalia fears that
224. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
225. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2294 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I shall
devote most of what will be a lengthy opinion to the legal errors contained in the opinion of
the Court. Contrary to my usual practice, however, I think it appropriate to begin with a
description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done today.").
226. Id.
227. id. at 2275 (stating that detainees need not wait for the completion of review of their
CSRT in the Court of Appeals before bringing a habeas action in federal district court).
228. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
229. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2008) (granting the
petition for writ of habeas corpus for five GTMO detainees). On October 8, 2008, Judge
Ricardo Urbina became the first United States District Court judge to release detainees from
GTMO. See Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 581 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008). This
ruling was "the first such ruling in nearly seven years of legal disputes over the [Bush]
administration's detention policies." William Glaberson, Jude Orders 17 Detainees at
Guantanamo Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A 18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/washington/08detain.html. Judge Urbina released 17
detainees in total from GTMO, all of whom are "Uighurs"-members of a Muslim community
in western China. id.
On November 6, 2008, United States District Judge Richard Leon presided over the case
Boumediene v. Bush in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. See
Boumediene v. Bush, No. 579 F.Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2008). Lakhdar Boumediene, along
with five other petitioners, alleged that President George W. Bush was unlawfully detaining
them at GTMO. Id. at 192-93. The Government representatives-relying upon classified
government evidence-argued that the six petitioners intended to travel to Afghanistan in 2001
to take up arms against the United States. Id. at 196. On November 20, 2008, Judge Leon
ordered the release of five of the petitioners from GTMO stating that he could not "adequately
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some of the released detainees will return to the battlefield in the
Middle East, or even worse, coordinate another attack like the one
executed on September 11, 2001. 230  Scalia is worried about the
potential loss of more American lives.23'
V. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's language in his Boumediene dissent is
influenced by fear of an unfamiliar race and its religious practices. 232
Though Scalia's fear is not unfounded considering the September 11,
2001 attacks,233 Scalia's demonstration of that fear in his dissent is
unprecedented in previous habeas corpus jurisprudence. 234  Perhaps
Scalia's demonstrated fear of an unfamiliar race and religion in
Boumediene was a last-ditch effort to influence courts' future habeas
corpus opinions. 35 The storied history of habeas corpus jurisprudence
in the United States-especially the chess match that the Supreme Court
and Congress have played with the Guantanamo Bay 23  detainee
assess the credibility and reliability" of the classified evidence. Id. "All six men were arrested
by Bosnian authorities in October 2001 for their alleged involvement in a plot to bomb the
U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo." Id. at 193.
One former GTMO prisoner, Ali al-Shihri, detainee #372, was released in November 2007 and
has already rejoined al Qaeda as second in command in Yemen. Robert F. Worth, Freed by
U.S., Saudi Becomes a Qaeda [sic] Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/23/world/middleeast/23yemen.html?src=tp; Detainee List,
supra note 16.
230. See supra text accompanying note 193.
231. Id.
232. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("America is at war with
radical Islamists.").
233. See supra Part IV.A.
234. See supra Part IV.B.
235. See supra Part V.C.
236. See supra Part It. On January 22, 2009-Barack Obama's second full day as
President of the United States-President Obama ordered GTMO to be closed within one year-
an order pleasing to several liberal humanitarian organizations. Mark Mazzetti, Obama Issues
Directive to Shut Down Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/22/us/politics/22gitmo.html. On that date, 245 detainees
suspected of terrorist acts were imprisoned at GTMO, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed-
the alleged mastermind behind the September II attacks. Pursuant to Obama's order, each
GTMO detainee will be prosecuted, released, or transferred. However, questions remain as to
where detainees will be transferred and in what courts they will be tried. President Obama is
not a proponent of military tribunals. During his presidential campaign, Obama suggested that
he would prefer federal prosecutions in civilian courts to replace military commissions. Id.
Dennis C. Blair, U.S. Director of National Intelligence under the Obama administration and
retired U.S. Navy admiral, stated that GTMO must be closed because it is "a damaging symbol
to the world." Id. Blair continued:
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pawns-should lead us to believe that we will know soon enough
whether Scalia's last-ditch effort will be persuasive in the courts'
future habeas corpus opinions.
237
The guiding principles for closing the center should beprotecting [sic] our
national security, respecting the Geneva Conventions and the rule of law,
and respecting the existing institutions of justice in this country. I also
believe we should revitalize efforts to transfer detainees to their countries
of origin or other countries whenever that would be consistent with these
principles. Closing this center and satisfying these principles will take
time, and is the work of many departments and agencies.
Id.
237. See supra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. The President of the United States
appoints Supreme Court Justices. U.S. CONST. art 11, § 2. With the retirement of Supreme
Court Justices David Souter and John Paul Stevens, and the possible retirement of current
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, age 75, the election of President Barack Obama has given hope
to democrats that the conservative justices of the Supreme Court-such as Justice Scalia-will
be balanced by three liberal nominees. David G. Savage, Obama and the Supreme Court, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008; Robert Barnes, Analysis: Justice Souter's Retirement, Likely
Replacements on Supreme Court, WASH. POST, May 1, 2009, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentldiscussion/2009/05/01/Di2009050101585.html.
On May 26, 2009, President Obama nominated Sonia Sotomayor, formerly of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in New York, to replace Justice Souter. Peter
Baker and Jeff Zeleny, Obama Hails Judge as 'Inspiring,' N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at AI,
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/27/us/politics/27court.html?scp=2&sq=sotomayor/ 2nomi
nation%20May&st=cse. On August 8, 2009, Justice Sotomayor was sworn in by Chief Justice
Roberts, becoming the Il IIh justice to serve on the United States Supreme Court. Justice
Sotomayor is the first Hispanic justice and the third female justice to serve on the Court. Amy
Goldstein, Sotomayor Reaches Pinnacle of Law With Historic Oath, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/contentlarticle/2009/08/08/AR2009080800982.html?sid=ST2009080800983.

